by Anastasiia Nahorna and Rostyslav Kozachenko, Transport & Environment; and Nataliia Volyk, Centre for Environmental Initiatives "Ecoaction"
16 November 2026
Every morning, millions of Ukrainians witness the same ritual: the crush on the metro and the hope of crossing the Dnipro as quickly as possible, minibuses packed to the brim, and the endless despair of passengers at remote stops. This outdated model of public transport, dating back to the 1990s, has long since run its course.
A new legislative framework for public service obligations is set to come fully into force in Ukraine, designed to bring public transport into line with EU Regulation No. 1370/2007. In September, Ukraine’s Ministry of Recovery, Infrastructure and Transport submitted a package of draft laws for consultation, intended to replace the outdated Soviet system of tenders and unregulated subsidies with transparent European contracts in line with the Regulation.
According to the Ministry’s position, the transition is planned to take place in stages: by 2029, the new model is set to cover 10% of territorial communities (hromadas); by 2030, 40%; by 2031, 75%; and by 2032, all 100% of the country’s hromadas are to be operating under the new rules.
Experts from the NGOs Transport & Environment and Ecoaction have analysed this package of draft laws for contradictions and ambiguous wording in comparison with EU Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU on public procurement and Regulation (EU) No. 1370/2007. After all, it is important not only to have a well-drafted law, but also to identify, in good time, the implementation risks that could block the reform in practice. Harmonisation with EU rules will enable Ukrainian local authorities to properly regulate adequate compensation for transport operators and bring Ukrainian competition law closer to European standards.
Light at the end of the tunnel: The essence of the reform
The fundamental difference of the new model for public transport is that operators no longer compete for cash from passengers’ pockets. The competent authority pays transport operators for the transport services actually provided, based on mileage and the fulfilment of additional passenger comfort criteria, such as adherence to timetables or an appropriate standard of passenger service. Thus, the mechanism for compensating transport operators is intended to provide appropriate incentives for the effective fulfilment of their specific obligations.
The current draft documents propose entering into long-term contracts for fixed periods of 10 years (for buses and trolleybuses) or 15 years (for trams and the underground). For investors, this guarantees that a new bus or trolleybus purchased on credit will have time to pay for itself. However, we also recommend providing for the possibility of concluding shorter contracts (of up to 10 years), particularly at the start of the reform, as was done in Budapest at the outset of its reform: the first contracts with private transport operators were concluded for 2-3 years where the rolling stock was old, and for 8 years if the operator had new vehicles. Subsequently, contract terms were extended, with priority given to operators who had modernised their fleets.
At the same time, the documents set target quotas for electric transport and requirements for the accessibility of vehicles, including ramps, low floors, and audio and visual passenger information systems.
It also makes the launch of an automated fare collection system (i.e. an electronic ticketing system) and GPS monitoring mandatory. This closes loopholes for illegal journeys disguised as ‘irregular’ services and brings cash flows out of the shadow economy, which will increase tax revenue.
And, of course, the package of draft laws introduces important new concepts, such as ‘contract for the provision of public service obligations’, ‘concession contracts’, and ‘exclusive right’, and sets out the key principles for compensation for transport services, as laid down in the EU Regulation and related directives. This is precisely what we have been advocating for in our previous appeals to the authorities.
Nothing is perfect: What are the risks of the reform?
However, despite a sound terminological framework and a clear description of key aspects, a number of critical gaps have been identified in the current draft legislation.
Firstly, it is important to address the elephant in the room: the lack of funds available in the budget. According to official estimates accompanying the draft legislation, expenditure on implementing the public transport model between 2029 and 2032 will amount to UAH 54.02 billion, whilst the net additional budget deficit will reach UAH 11.82 billion. At the same time, the draft proposes to fully exempt transport operators from VAT (whereas EU countries apply reduced rates, for example 8% in Poland), which risks depriving budgets of revenue precisely when the need for subsidies will be critical.
The next critical issue appears to be the overly complex structure of transport organisation across urban, inter-city, regional, and inter-regional levels. This will complicate communication between local authorities regarding the development of joint routes, the creation of a single ticket, and the subsequent distribution of transport subsidies. Here, we could at the very least look to the experience of Poland, which also has a multi-tiered transport system (gmina, powiat, voivodeship, national level). A reform has recently been launched there to prioritise the provision of financial compensation from the specialised Bus Transport Development Fund (FRPA). The new regulations are intended to give county-gmina associations and voivodeships priority in the allocation of funds from the FRPA. Thus, it is possible to envisage prioritising budget subsidies for public service obligations for so-called authorised enterprises (non-profit enterprises providing integrated transport services agreed between the competent authorities), which may encourage their establishment and the coordination of transport operations.
Another risky aspect is the definition of an in-house operator. For instance, the draft legislation allows municipal enterprises to have up to 49% of private capital whilst simultaneously securing direct contracts to provide services of public interest without a tender process. This contravenes EU Directives 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU on public procurement.
According to these provisions, the conclusion of a direct contract:
for the provision of services of public importance is possible in the absence of private capital within the in-house operator;
for concession contracts, the in-house operator may have a share of private capital, but this must not be dominant and the competent authority must retain overriding control over the operator’s activities.
Furthermore, the in-house operator must provide passenger transport services exclusively within the territory of the competent authority; this is not currently specified in the draft law and could lead to legal conflicts and unfair competition between municipal operators and private transport providers.
Furthermore, the package of draft laws currently favours transport operators who wish to skim only the ‘cream’ of the market, whilst failing to address the issue of connectivity in remote areas. The risk is that, in a free market, private companies will compete only for short, highly profitable central routes. And if tenders are conducted in a haphazard manner, remote villages, outlying areas, and holiday home estates that lack municipal transport operators may be left without transport services. We therefore recommend adopting a ‘hub-and-spoke’ approach to contracts for services of public importance. Combining highly profitable routes with less profitable ones into a single tender lot will help reduce the financial pressure on the competent authorities and improve connectivity between communities.
We have also identified another inconsistency: whilst the legislation itself comes into force on 1 January 2028, certain provisions require that, as early as 1 January 2027, the proportion of accessible trolleybuses must already be at least 50 per cent. Furthermore, the timetable for the transition period is not included in the text of the law itself, but is only specified in the budgetary estimates.
A chance for change: What public transport reform should look like
All the risks outlined above can be overcome or their impact minimised. We therefore recommend the following amendments to the legislative package:
To reduce the projected budget deficit, instead of completely abolishing VAT, a reduced rate should be introduced, with the resulting revenue channelled into targeted subventions for hromadas.
To simplify the multi-tiered bureaucracy, we propose encouraging the establishment of authorised enterprises, inter-municipal bodies that will commission transport services and be responsible for coordinated and integrated network planning in order to achieve the multimodality envisaged by the draft legislation. A transparent compensation formula, in line with EU rules, should be adopted, with compensation calculated on the basis of the net financial effect principle: Costs − Direct Revenue − Indirect Benefits + Reasonable Profit.
European practices can serve as a benchmark for setting a reasonable profit margin: Croatia’s experience in the context of urban bus transport (8-12%), the Romanian municipal operator STB (3.57%), which manages ground transport in Bucharest, or the operating margin of the Scandinavian bus giant ‘Nobina’ (4.9%).
A ‘bundled’ approach to routes should be enshrined in methodological guidelines. This practice is already being successfully applied in Ukrainian cities (for example, Nizhyn and Korosten), whilst in Germany (particularly in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia) special ‘route bundles’ (Linienbündel) are being formed.
The wording ‘for a period of 10 years’ should be changed to ‘for a period of up to 10 years’, with the right to extend the agreement by up to a further 50 per cent in the event of significant capital investment in new rolling stock, as also stipulated in the EU Regulation.
We recommend giving preference in tenders to buses meeting the latest Euro standards or fitted with electric motors in order to achieve the draft law’s ambitious targets. Experience from Copenhagen (Movia) shows that long-term contracts (up to 14 years) can be awarded for eco-friendly and electric buses, whilst shorter contracts are appropriate for diesel buses.
As the disbursement of budget funds will depend exclusively on e-ticket data, it is necessary to set clear deadlines for transport operators to connect to the Automated Fare Collection System, with a gradual increase in technical access fees for those who delay compliance.
The Public Service Obligation reform is Ukraine’s chance to build a modern, European-standard transport system.
However, to ensure that this legislative initiative does not become a financial burden on local communities, we call on the relevant legislative bodies to take the concerns raised by experts into account and amend the draft legislation before it is finally adopted.
This opinion piece was originally published in Ukrainian on the website of the Centre for Transport Strategies.