Bridge Strategy of Ukraine. Five action points to save bridges and give them a chance of being rebuilt

by Viktor Zagreba, Head of NGO Vision Zero

13 October 2026

In the autumn of 2026, the aggressor state intensified attacks on Ukraine’s main bridges across the Dnipro River. Previously, important bridge crossings in Bessarabia had also been subjected to attacks. It cannot be ruled out that strikes on these targets will continue. Such a situation has naturally increased media and public attention to this topic. In expert and political circles, several lines of discussion have emerged: countering future attacks, preparing for possible worst-case scenarios, as well as exploring more creative and speculative ideas for the future, such as pontoons, ferries and even tunnels.

What is missing is a strategic approach to thinking and discussion. This text is an attempt to support such an approach. It draws on an in-depth analytical study, Bridges in Ukraine: Crisis, Problems and Way Forward, which the author published in 2025.

Bridges are a vital part of transport systems. The people of Kyiv, and indeed the whole country, have seen this clearly: when a bridge ceases to function, the whole system can grind to a halt. Bridges are in fact more important than ordinary sections of roads or streets. A destroyed or temporarily blocked section of road can be bypassed using a nearby road, the roadside or a field, or even on foot. But a destroyed span of a bridge cannot simply be bypassed.

This text examines infrastructure from the perspective of public policy. The purpose of public policy is to solve problems. Therefore, it is worth starting any analysis or proposal with problems, not solutions.

Definition of the problem

In Ukraine, according to official estimates, there are about 28,500 bridges (as of 2024). Approximately a quarter of them are officially in one of two poor operational conditions: 4,000 bridges are in the fourth operational state (‘limited operational condition’) and about 2,200 bridges are in the fifth state (‘non-operational’). These bridges are essentially already deteriorating from within, even though they remain open to traffic. Why? Because of structural deterioration. Due to the lack of scheduled repairs, minor damage has gradually developed into the degradation of structural elements.

Moreover, the state has no information about the technical condition of about 9,000 bridges. Let us assume that a quarter of them, approximately 2,250, are also in the fifth operational state or are approaching it. If this is the case, the total number of bridges requiring urgent intervention is about 5,000.

The situation is already critical. In theory and under technical standards, bridges, like other transport and municipal infrastructure, require regular maintenance (basic upkeep), as well as scheduled routine and major repairs. Since 1991, routine maintenance has been carried out unevenly or insufficiently, while repairs have either not been carried out at all or have often been limited to resurfacing the carriageway. As a result, not only has structural damage accumulated, but so has a huge ‘investment debt’: work that the state and local asset holders should have carried out but did not. The need for investment has not disappeared; after three decades, the bill for maintaining all this existing infrastructure has simply accumulated into an enormous sum.

Service life. Bridge structures have a design service life, and for many structures this period has long since expired. Their service life must either be extended through major repairs, a new bridge must be built to replace the old one, or the structure must simply be dismantled. Failing to acknowledge, or continuing to ignore, this large-scale crisis will not solve it; it will only make it worse.

The manifestations of the problem are clear: thousands of bridges, used every day by vehicles and pedestrians, do not merely threaten to collapse at any moment; some actually do collapse. Bridge collapses occur with worrying regularity. In 2026, no major bridges on the main highways collapsed (the media recorded only one bridge collapse, in Korostyshiv on a road of national importance, as well as several collapses of local structures in cities and communities). But it is just a matter of time. In previous years, there were numerous cases in different regions in which trucks and cars fell along with collapsing bridges. Most worrying is the fact that some crossings of the Dnipro are among the bridges at risk of collapse and classified as being in the fifth operational state. Transport professionals may recall the collapse of the road bridge in Genoa, Italy, in 2018, when dozens of people were killed. I do not want to tempt fate, but something similar could happen in Ukraine: the statistical probability is not zero.

Scale of the challenge and conditions

How can we rebuild approximately 5,000 bridges throughout the country, including two or three exceptionally large and expensive bridges across the Dnipro, and do so as quickly as possible? How can we even begin to prepare projects for tunnels beneath bodies of water when Ukraine has no such infrastructure at present and lacks the relevant expertise and experience? Even without a full-scale war and with a well-funded State Road Fund, this would be an extremely difficult task. Under the new conditions of a comprehensive crisis, it is more difficult still.

Strategy proposal

A good strategy, they say, should be short enough to be drawn with a pen on a napkin. Therefore, what follows is not a large, 20-page document, but just two pages and five basic points which, in my opinion, should form the basis of the strategy. Brief and clear.

1. Establish a strict priority: give up everything that can be dispensed with. In the austerity regime that the government has announced and that is likely to last for a long time, we have no right to undertake unnecessary projects or incur unnecessary costs. The focus should be on those bridges that I call indispensable, in the sense that there is ‘no way around’ them: bridges that cannot easily be bypassed and cannot be replaced by a temporary crossing. The classic examples are the bridges across the Dnipro, not only those in Kyiv. These long-neglected crossings should finally become a priority, with all possible resources directed towards them. The budget of the City of Kyiv, in fact, has sufficient resources for this purpose. And state resources, when they become available, should be directed towards the state bridges farther downstream.

At the same time, a bridge or overpass that can be bypassed or substituted by a diversion should not be a priority and should instead be placed on a ‘blacklist’. Where there are currently temporary embankments with pipes across small rivers, they should remain in place for the coming years, especially where traffic volumes are minimal. Where emergency supports can be installed cheaply and quickly, they should be installed, so that the bridge does not collapse for another 30 to 40 years. Where an overpass is in an emergency condition, it should be dismantled and an at-grade solution introduced (more on this in point 4).

Prioritisation means being able to say ‘no’ systematically and to reject projects. We should not design or build bridges (whether through new construction, reconstruction or major repairs) if we can realistically manage without them.

2. Provide funding for maintenance, inspections and routine repairs. This is the cheapest and, at the same time, the most important part of the strategy. Infrastructure maintenance is like dental hygiene: a toothbrush, toothpaste, water and the time spent brushing cost very little, but if you neglect them, you will subsequently have to pay large bills for treatment and implants. Saving on toothpaste because you have to pay the rent is a bad idea.

In 2025, the state allocated about UAH 12 billion a year for road maintenance. The then-head of the State Agency for Restoration explained that this was nowhere near even the minimum required for a road network of this scale. Therefore, the actual cost of maintenance needs to be properly calculated, and maintenance should become a protected budget item funded through the restored State Road Fund.

Savings should be sought elsewhere (see points 1, 3 and 4); maintenance is precisely the area where cutting spending means deliberately allowing an asset to deteriorate. We should not forget inspections and routine repairs: regular inspections and the detection and treatment of ‘tooth decay’ in the early stages are no less important than daily hygiene. Repairing minor damage in time prevents structural degradation and can cost hundreds of times less than major repairs later on.

3. Complete regulatory and market integration with Europe. Our market for bridge design and construction is isolated from the rest of the world. Previously, it formed part of a common market with the Russian Federation and Belarus, but this has not been the case for the past 12 years. We design according to our own national traditions and conduct procurement according to our own standards; feasibility studies are often carried out merely as a formality, while works contracts follow their own distinctive model.

Integration into the EU means adopting European standards and practices and joining the common market. It also means modernising Ukraine’s DBN standards to make them more rational, reduce costs and lower the consumption of materials and financial resources, while maintaining structural capacity and safety.

The first reason why this is important is that Ukraine must finally fulfil its obligations, some of which are more than 20 years old, starting with the transition to designing according to the Eurocodes (European EN standards) instead of the DBN.

The second reason for European integration is the sheer scale of our challenge. I cannot envisage a scenario in which Ukraine can manage alone. If we want even the slightest chance of carrying out the mass reconstruction of bridges, this can only be done together. We need to aim for hundreds of projects every year. These projects require engineering companies, contractors and suppliers and, most importantly, financing, which will most likely need to come from international sources.

The third reason is that we must save money more than ever before, so that we can build two bridges for the cost of one. As long as we continue to operate in isolation and within the post-Soviet regulatory system, our bridges will remain overdesigned, heavier and more expensive than they need to be. According to my research, in which I compared a sample of 29 specific bridges in Ukraine and Poland, a square metre of bridge in Ukraine costs 48% more than in neighbouring Poland. Moreover, the overall bridge area is often designed to be much larger than necessary, primarily because of excessive width.

Europe does not need Ukraine’s European integration; Ukraine does. It will make reconstruction, first, realistic and, second, more rational in terms of the cost-benefit ratio.

4. Optimisation rather than development: managing assets and liabilities. Development in infrastructure means expanding networks and constructing new facilities. In the current conditions, public policy should move away from thinking in terms of ‘infrastructure development’ and towards more appropriate concepts: modernisation, optimisation, reducing losses and liabilities, and asset management.

For example, it is through this lens that we should look at liabilities such as roads and bridges that are in an extremely degraded state but carry very little traffic and have little transport significance. It would be worth strategically reassessing the network of roads of national importance. Some roads or sections of roads could either be downgraded or even scheduled for decommissioning.

Emergency bridges on low-priority, lightly trafficked roads can be strengthened or replaced with temporary solutions. For example, they could be converted from two lanes to one; such bridges can be found even on roads in Sweden and Norway. At the local level, especially in cities, it may be more appropriate to plan the dismantling, rather than the reconstruction, of old Soviet overpasses, particularly those that do not cross major railway lines.

As a result, cities could regain at-grade junctions that are accessible to people and inexpensive to maintain. Well-designed traffic signal control and roundabouts could provide standard solutions of the kind used in hundreds of locations in other countries.

5. Prepare and implement strategic projects through international channels. Large new bridges (or alternative connections such as tunnels) across bodies of water should be prepared and implemented at the European level. They require dedicated workstreams, designated responsible persons and instruments for attracting finance.

In the author’s view, it is realistic, and perhaps even inevitable, that one of these workstreams will involve projects implemented as PPPs (public-private partnerships). This could include a large-scale programme to repair 500 ordinary bridges, following Slovakia’s example, using availability payments, as well as individual projects across the Dnipro and other rivers implemented under concession arrangements.

Yes, this means that tolls would be charged for using these future bridges. But a toll bridge that exists is better than a free bridge that does not exist and never will. An important detail of this model is that a private partner that not only builds the infrastructure but subsequently maintains it at its own expense for decades has no incentive to artificially inflate specifications, material consumption or project costs, because it will not receive additional payment for doing so.

Another workstream, or perhaps several, could involve loan-financed projects, an area in which Ukraine has already gained experience through co-operation with international and national financial institutions in Europe.

These are the five basic points for further development and discussion. None of them can be implemented within a single year, and none will resolve itself. But together they provide something that is currently missing: strategic direction. All of this is, of course, open to discussion, and the author invites such a discussion.

Who should take ownership of this problem and the strategy for addressing it? From which year should Eurocodes become mandatory for bridge projects? Which crossings should we identify as priorities and commit to preserving first? When, and with whose support, will we begin preparing several large projects through international channels?

These questions require discussion, and I invite colleagues, officials, journalists, civil society organisations and everyone who understands that the bridge crisis will not resolve itself to join that discussion.

This opinion piece was originally published in Ukrainian on the website of the Centre for Transport Strategies.