Position of Ukrainian civil society organisations on the adopted Ukraine Plan
Kyiv, Ukraine
April 16, 2024
Centre for Environmental Initiatives “Ecoaction”, NGO Ecoclub and CEE Bankwatch prepared a position on the final text of the Ukraine Plan adopted by the government.
We, the undersigned Ukrainian and international civil society organisations, express our gratitude and appreciation for the European Commission’s continued support for Ukraine, which contributes to the further integration of our country into the EU.
We welcome the adopted Ukraine Facility Regulation, which confirms the EU’s longstanding support for Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation. This support is dependent on the implementation of key reforms necessary for charting Ukraine’s EU accession path between 2024 and 2027.
The Regulation text outlines a clear vision for Ukraine’s future development with a focus on meaningful engagement with stakeholders, allocates funds to Ukraine’s subnational authorities, and strengthens the principles of ‘do no significant harm’ and ‘leave no one behind’. Significantly, the Regulation mandates that at least 20 per cent of funding under the Ukraine Investment Framework and Ukraine Plan be dedicated to measures focusing on climate, the environment, and the green transition, including biodiversity.
On 20 March 2024, the Ukraine Plan, the country’s reform and investment agenda, was officially submitted to the European Commission for review. As stated in paragraph 18 of the Regulation, the Ukraine Plan should ‘encourage Ukraine to channel investments and reforms towards the transition to a green, sustainable, digital and inclusive economy’.
In our previous comments on the draft Ukraine Plan, we proposed various amendments, particularly with regard to the lack of meaningful consultations with civil society and other interested stakeholders. In Paragraph 6, Article 4 of the Regulation, the European Commission makes a commitment to oversee stakeholder engagement:
In line with the principle of inclusive partnership, the Commission shall strive to ensure, as appropriate, democratic scrutiny in the form of consultation by the Ukrainian government of the Verkhovna Rada in accordance with the constitutional order of Ukraine, as well as of relevant stakeholders, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, including vulnerable groups, so as to allow them to participate in shaping the design and implementation of activities eligible for funding under the Facility and in the related monitoring, scrutiny and evaluation processes, as relevant.
Bearing this principle in mind, we urge the European Commission to facilitate inclusive and meaningful engagement with partners and stakeholders on the officially submitted Ukraine Plan. We have analysed the document and wish to share our comments on the following strategic areas: the green transition and environmental protection, the energy sector, the agri-food sector, and the transport sector. While there are certain aspects of these areas that we support, we believe there is also much room for improvement.
1. The green transition and environmental protection
We strongly endorse the commitment made in the Ukraine Plan to incorporate the principles of the green transition and ‘do no significant harm’ across all sectors and allocating 20 per cent of the financing budget to green investments. To bring about a successful green transition in Ukraine, close integration with all reforms is crucial. It is also imperative that the European Commission continues to issue guidance on implementing relevant EU legislation and the Ukraine Facility Regulation.
At the same time, we have identified areas where the Ukraine Plan could be improved:
Achieving a green transition requires implementing climate change adaptation measures across all sectors at both national and local levels. The local focus is vital since communities are ultimately tasked with developing and implementing recovery plans and projects in their regions. Therefore, the principle of the green transition must be incorporated into the methodology used for local planning, and community representatives must be empowered with the knowledge to successfully implement these plans. Providing ongoing support for communities as they enact these measures is crucial.
The component of Reform 4 – ‘Entry into force of legislation to reduce deforestation and forest degradation’ – uneasily coexists with plans to increase timber production from 15 to 25 million cubic metres over the next 10 years and wood processing from 9 to 20 million cubic metres. Such a significant increase in logging is impossible to reconcile with a reduction in forest degradation. Legislative trends in the EU and environmental interests, including the prevention of forest degradation in line with the EU Deforestation Regulation, should be at the core of any strategic forestry planning.
The component of Reform 6 – ‘Publication of a concept note defining the scope of derogations from the (EIA) and (SEA) rules’ – is a matter of some concern. Due to the existing restrictions on EIAs, where various projects use certain criteria and are not subject to EIAs, as well as several new amendments to legislation (in forestry – draft law 9516; the Law on promotion investments, which cancel EIA and SEA for five years even after the war; the Law on Administrative Procedures contains an exception to the EIA legislation). Therefore, without clear criteria, timelines and justifications for EIA and SEA derogations, we are concerned about what else we can expect from this reform. There should be clear criteria and reasonable deadlines for critical needs for EIA and SEA derogations during the planning stage of the reform and before it is adopted.
2. Energy sector
We are encouraged to see that the Ukraine Plan has addressed several of our key concerns. These include liberalising electricity and gas prices, strengthening the regulatory framework to increase renewable energy and ensure a stable energy system, improving efficiency in district heating, and adopting energy-efficient practices in public buildings and procurement procedures. We also appreciate the inclusion of these provisions alongside concrete action points.
However, the following issues still need to be addressed:
Concerningly, the Plan refers to the ‘renaissance of nuclear generation’, namely the construction of new large power units (1000–1200 megawatts) and small modular reactors. However, the attempts of the EU and the United Kingdom to build new nuclear capacity over the last 20 years show that the construction of new units inevitably leads to cost over-runs and delays. Given Russia’s continuing war of aggression, particularly its ongoing occupation of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, we strongly believe that the construction of new nuclear units in Ukraine is not a financially stable, economically profitable, or secure option.
New nuclear capacity, especially in the form of large power units like those planned for Khmelnytskyi nuclear power plant, will serve to further centralise Ukraine’s energy system. These proposals contradict other parts of the Plan that promote decentralisation of the energy system and distributed generation from renewables. Given Russia’s ongoing targeted attacks on Ukraine’s generation, transformation and transmission facilities, centralised solutions like new nuclear power plants would be a big mistake. This approach would also divert critical attention and financial resources away from the immediate need to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security. Instead, priority should be given to swift implementation of secure and sustainable distributed energy projects that align with the European Green Deal and the principle of ‘build back better’.
We are also alarmed by the possibility that a portion of the Ukraine Facility budget could be used to purchase nuclear reactors from EU Member States, a scenario that should be avoided at all costs.
3. Agri-food sector
Within this section of the plan there is a clear emphasis on small and medium-sized farms and the inclusion of an environmental approach to agriculture in alignment with EU goals. We also appreciate the focus on reforming the advisory service system. Introducing a system for sharing agricultural knowledge and promoting innovation among farmers is also a positive development.
However, the following issues have been overlooked:
On the one hand, Ukraine has a favourable landscape and natural conditions for agricultural development. However, current mainstream farming practices worsen soil degradation, which is now being exacerbated by the impacts of war. To maintain agricultural sustainability, the Plan needs to address structural issues and threats in relation to land use and soil conditions. Urgent action must be taken to reduce the amount of arable land, a large portion of which has been degraded, while simultaneously increasing productivity on fertile land suitable for cultivation.
In terms of the sectoral approach to climate change adaptation, the Plan prioritises irrigation reform. However, the sector’s adaptation to the climate crisis should be considered comprehensively and in line with mitigation measures where applicable. Before Russia’s invasion, the sector experienced a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions. It was also one of the first to suffer from the negative impacts of the climate crisis on production. To mitigate these effects, likely to increase in severity, a comprehensive strategy aimed at helping the agriculture sector adapt to the climate crisis should be developed.
4. Transport sector
We welcome the inclusion of important guiding principles for transport development, including sustainability, decarbonisation, ‘build back better’, ‘do no significant harm’, accessibility, and transport safety. We also appreciate the commitment to integrate with the Trans-European Transport Network policy, invest in sustainable infrastructure nodes (particularly for rail and water transport), and electrify public transport.
However, the Plan fails to address the following issues:
The transport policy outlined in the Plan should align with the objectives of the European Green Deal. Ukraine’s upcoming revised Transport Strategy must also meet the EU’s long-term targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, specifically net-zero emissions by 2050 and the proposed 2040 targets. This long-term vision also requires that the aviation and shipping industries become compliant with the ReFuelEU aviation and FuelEU maritime initiatives in a bid to meet future fuel requirements. Fulfilling these objectives will help Ukraine contribute to the EU’s climate goals and safeguard its own national security.
Another important aspect is the need to plan the phase-out of the sales of internal combustion engine light duty vehicles and implement measures for charges on polluting heavy-duty vehicles. This should be accompanied by the implementation of government-supported scrappage schemes for inefficient and ageing internal combustion engine vehicles alongside measures to foster green mobility.
The Plan needs to shift away from continuous expansion and invest more in infrastructure maintenance and road safety. To maintain low motorisation rates, alleviate congestion, and mitigate the negative impacts of road traffic on air, particle, and noise pollution, there needs to be more focus on improving public transport services in cities and suburban areas.
We wish to reiterate the importance of ensuring transparent data collection when it comes to developing transport policies and investments. To effectively monitor and analyse the impacts of infrastructure investments, relevant transport data must be collected, stored and made publicly available in line with Eurostat best practice.
We hope our proposals will prove useful during the further assessment of the Ukraine Plan. Ukrainian civil society remains at your disposal, whether through actively collaborating with EU institutions or verifying important information on the ground.
Centre for Environmental Initiatives “Ecoaction”
NGO Ecoclub
CEE Bankwatch Network