Building back better? Fifty shades of green at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025
As Ukraine battles Russian aggression, the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2025 highlighted the country’s ongoing efforts in reconstruction, green transition, and EU integration. However, environmental concerns were largely sidelined in favor of economic and energy priorities, raising critical questions about Ukraine’s green recovery and its balancing act between urgent reforms and environmental responsibility.
This year’s Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2025), held in Rome on July 10-11, was the largest to date, hosting around 6,000 participants. The annual high-level political event both reflects on and aims to spur political and economic activities through the lenses of resilience and recovery. Following a participatory “whole society” approach, the conference seeks to bring together “governments, international organizations, financial institutions, businesses, regions, municipalities and civil society”. Featuring heads of state and other political celebrities, signals of confidence, opportunities for collaboration, and programs announced during the event have received wide attention, with some of the reporting highlighting the social and environmental dimensions of Ukraine’s recovery (see, for example, Prismag’s coverage of the URC 2025).
Across two intense days and over 50 different sessions, panels, and side events, URC 2025 showcased an extraordinary diversity of actors and interests, making the event difficult to summarize. However, the following points reflect some of the general sense over many speeches and discussions. As Russian aggression continues, including a record wave of missile and drone attacks during the event itself, it is difficult to anticipate the war’s end, and adaptation to these circumstances is imperative. Under these conditions, resilience has become a leitmotif, sidelining conversations about recovery. EU accession is no longer a question; it is underway. With careful decision-making, the current situation, as painful as it is, provides opportunities for reforms, green transition and investment. The latter reflects a specific political and economic pragmatism that could be sensed during presentations and debates. At the same time, the scale of unmet reconstruction and recovery needs remains huge, and continued political action and investments are needed to keep Ukraine afloat. Environmental challenges stand beside many other challenges. So what role did environmental issues play during this year’s URC?
Role of environmental issues in Ukraine’s recovery plans
Environmental issues were addressed to various extents during panels and side events dedicated to topics including energy, municipal recovery projects, and agriculture. However, they were not a cross-cutting theme and were hardly mentioned by high-level political representatives in opening speeches. In this respect, the URC 2025 did not live up to the Lugano Principles, announced at URC 2022, which listed sustainability as a guiding principle. Decarbonization and progressive environmental legislation were most consistently addressed within the framework of EU accession, particularly regarding adaptation to EU standards and alignment with the EU Green Deal. Then-Minister of Energy German Galushchenko spoke of “our decarbonization targets, our integration goals” as if these were two sides of the same coin. The Ukraine Green Recovery draft law was a frequently cited example of reforms underway. It aligns recovery with the transition to a “green economy” and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities.
A panel on “Environmental Restoration” was the sole session fully dedicated to the environment. It brought together experts and officials, including Svitlana Hrynchuk, then-Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, participating online, and Margot Wallström, co-chair of the High-Level Working Group on the Environmental Consequences of the War, to address a broad spectrum of issues from environmental damage, health impacts, and green legislation to ecosystem recovery, demining, and green investment. Initiatives such as the Green Recovery Platform were presented as vehicles for advancing these challenges. Despite raising important points and some strong statements, the Ukrainian Minister of the Environment’s physical absence from the URC for a second year was a bad sign concerning the prioritization of environmental protection.
Environmental concerns were also strongly featured at the Challenges, Opportunities and Case Studies for Ukraine’s Green Reconstruction side event, a gathering organized by European and Ukrainian industry associations alongside NGOs. Through concrete examples, from debris reuse and green public buildings to eco-material innovations, the event made a strong case for embedding circularity, climate-resilient infrastructure, and green innovation into Ukraine’s reconstruction. Despite those principles, the event’s presenters largely framed the green transition as a business case, with much of the momentum driven by local and sectoral actors rather than a coherent national strategy.
(Green) energy
Energy, a central topic at URC2025, provided the most consistent sustainability thread. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Commission (EC), and development partners heralded the “Ukraine Renewable Energy Risk Mitigation Mechanism” (URMM). Once implemented, “the mechanism is expected to support 1 GW of new renewable energy capacity, potentially mobilizing €1.5 billion in investments”, according to the EBRD. The EU has already endorsed an initial €180 million for the project, with several Ukrainian agencies and associations (Ukrainian Wind Energy Agency, Green Deal Ukraïna etc.) involved in this initiative. Mechanisms of this kind are important because they combine publicly backed financial guarantees, facilitate institutional coordination with private investment, and enable large-scale, strategic projects in the renewables sector, thus demonstrating a tangible commitment to green recovery. However, it’s worth asking how genuinely “green” these mechanisms are in practice.
Recent years have seen a rapid increase of unsustainable wind energy projects in western regions of Ukraine, many sited in biodiversity-rich areas, including protected landscapes, bird migration corridors, and sensitive habitats. These projects have often proceeded without adequate environmental safeguards, frequently ignoring or circumventing environmental impact assessments and lacking robust oversight to prevent ecological harm.
Several other themes prominently featured at the URC 2025 converged on energy issues. Energy is crucial for Ukraine’s short and long-term civil, military and economic resilience. Boosting Ukraine’s energy export capacity was also projected to become crucial for European energy security and the EU’s independence from Russian energy imports. However, some speakers did not differentiate between energy sources and took growing energy demand for granted, raising questions in environmental terms. Yet, a relatively coherent commitment to rolling out renewable energy capacity was tangible. Besides being more environmentally sustainable, decentralized smaller-scale renewable energy generation strengthens energy resilience in wartime because they are more resistant and difficult to destroy.
Given the (slow and partial) global shift toward renewable energy, bolstering its production in Ukraine is further presented as bringing the country on track for the future. During an energy side-event, Andrii Teliupa, Deputy Minister of Economy, stated “I believe green transition should not be about some ideology, it has to be about concrete feasible projects”. It was, in the end, a combination of such pragmatism and commitment to bigger ideas of green transition, immediate energy need and strategic importance, and public and private investments in the energy sector that resulted in lively debates and some credible commitments.
Meanwhile, despite the growing relevance of carbon markets for Ukraine’s recovery, the subject was not featured in the conference’s main agenda. It was instead addressed only at one side event, reflecting its preliminary status in national policy discussions. The potential interplay between voluntary and compliance carbon pricing is especially relevant for sectors leading the green transition, such as those dependent on critical raw materials, since access to these resources underpins both the scaling of low-carbon technologies and the effectiveness of emerging carbon market mechanisms.
Critical raw materials
Interestingly, URC 2025 presented Ukraine’s critical raw materials strategy as inseparable from economic transformation and green transition. From the main “Investing in Ukraine’s Critical Minerals: A Strategic Asset for Global Supply Chains” panel to side events, there was consistent emphasis on integrating raw material extraction with downstream processing, advanced manufacturing, and the circular economy. During several sessions, speakers highlighted new opportunities for joint production, international cooperation (notably with the EU and the UK), and strategic investment in flagship projects like the Balakhovsky graphite deposit. Many also pointed to efforts already underway to harmonize Ukraine’s legislative and strategic frameworks with OECD and EU standards, backed by support from the EBRD and mechanisms like the Global Reconstruction and Renovation Fund for Ukraine. Yet this framing raises a critical question: does positioning the critical raw materials sector at the heart of Ukraine’s green transition automatically make it sustainable? While the rhetoric of circularity and innovation was present, the underlying emphasis remained on growth, extraction, and geopolitical competitiveness.
Role of NGOs and civil society
Environmental NGOs were the most vocal and coherent advocates of environmental concerns at URC 2025. More NGO representatives registered to participate compared to previous URCs. They organized side events, met with members of the Italian Parliament and the German Ministry for the Environment, and used opportunities to interact with officials. However, few NGO representatives were invited to speak on panels where preference was instead given to high-level officials, government, bank, and business representatives. They spoke up in discussions, but discussion time was limited.
The Build Ukraine Back Better coalition of civil society organizations, think tanks and academic institutions had prepared the Roadmap for the Sustainable Recovery of Ukraine before this year’s URC and successfully promoted it during the event. The roadmap outlines “priority reforms, policies, and structural changes that need to be implemented over the next few years to ensure an environmentally sustainable and resilient recovery”. The roadmap is built on the primary principles of sustainable recovery and reconstruction and of climate neutrality by 2050, and it highlighted the implications of Ukraine’s EU integration for the key sectors of agriculture, construction, economy, energy, environment and transport. Several panel speakers mentioned the document and confirmed its significance as a comprehensive strategy.
Tensions and contradictions
Many speakers signaled confidence regarding the progress already made, noting the strength of the alliance gathered, projects and propositions already underway, and a bright(er) future for Ukraine. Pointing out synergies and win-win solutions is part of signalling optimism and some of these suggestions seem reasonable. For example, renewable energy sources can simultaneously serve energy resilience and the environment. Increased domestic processing of agricultural produce (rather than exporting raw products) simultaneously increases domestic value capture and biomass production to fuel bioenergy generation. Technologies for climate-smart agriculture are available and can provide multiple benefits.
There are limits and risks in projecting Ukraine as a land full of opportunities and potential. During some side events, held over wine in ancient Roman palazzos, it was tempting to forget these discussions centered on a country drawn into a brutal war. As Pavlo Kukhta, Ukraine’s former Minister of Economic Development, Trade and Agriculture, reminded the audience when invited to speak about untapped business opportunities, “the war is still going on, and there is nothing good about that”.
Moral questions aside, attention to the limitations and potential downsides of proclaimed win-win solutions is due. As protests and court cases in Ukraine and elsewhere show, renewable energy projects require solid screening and local participation to avoid harmful effects on biodiversity or local communities. The argument that increasing food processing will help renewable energy production comes with a risk of greenwashing resource-intensive, methane-emitting, and polluting kinds of animal husbandry.
Further, tensions appear when several grand promises and goals are put forward simultaneously. With the right programs, investments, and partnerships, advocates assert that Ukraine can increase its contribution to global food security, European energy security through biofuels, wind, and solar energy, and export large amounts of critical raw materials, while, at the same time, contributing to international goals of land recovery and protected areas. However, there are limits to the availability of land and natural resources, and the stresses put on Ukrainian ecosystems and soils in the past and during the war, are rarely mentioned.
Business opportunities, emphasized at some panels, side events and in the exhibition hall, are important to generate investment, which Ukraine urgently needs. However, opportunity-seeking businesses are not always the most reliable partners when it comes to issues of environmental sustainability or social justice, and their strategies and activities require close observation. Participatory and strategic planning and institutional coordination are important to direct investments in sustainable directions, governments and transnational organizations involved should be held accountable, and sustainability should be mainstreamed, particularly in business and industry.
Fast on the heels of the URC, a long-rumoured government reshuffle took place. The Cabinet of Ministers abolished the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, transferring their functions to a newly created Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine, headed by Oleksii Sobolev. Yulia Svyrydenko became the new Prime Minister of Ukraine, following the resignation of Denys Shmyhal. During the URC, then in her capacity as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Svyrydenko participated in multiple panels and bilateral meetings, emphasizing Ukraine’s determination to attract foreign investment and the role of international private capital in reconstruction. Shortly before, she announced a forthcoming moratorium on business inspections, and upon taking office, pledged to continue deregulation, protect businesses from undue pressure, accelerate privatization, and strengthen support for Ukrainian producers.
These developments could have significant implications for environmental governance and oversight. Concentrating the economic, environmental and agricultural portfolios in a single “super-ministry”, combined with a moratorium on business inspections and an agenda of deregulation and privatization, could weaken regulatory safeguards and environmental standards further, at a time when robust oversight is essential to ensure that reconstruction efforts are genuinely sustainable. Although the stated aim is to support Ukrainian businesses and accelerate recovery, it is unclear how these changes will impact the country’s capacity to enforce environmental protection and sustainability commitments in practice.
At the same time, Ukraine will be expected to demonstrate that it is upholding the environmental commitments it has made to both its citizens and its international partners. One key instrument in this regard is the recently approved “Strategy for Reforming the System of State Supervision in the Field of Environmental Protection through 2029”, endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers right before the URC. The reform aims to replace Ukraine’s historically punitive and fragmented system of environmental oversight with a modernized, preventive, and risk-based model. Yet with the independent Ministry of Environmental Protection now abolished, a question arises: who will attend to this ambitious agenda and ensure its effective implementation?
Learnings, outlook and strategies
There are more URCs to come, and discussions on how to rebuild Ukraine better and greener will continue. The Polish-Ukrainian URC 2026 presidency has an opportunity to enhance the debate around green reconstruction through mainstreaming sustainability across sectors and putting a much-needed spotlight on the recovery of the environment.
In the course of EU accession and institutional support programs, the EU, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and other transnational institutions drive and shape legal and regulatory reforms in Ukraine in areas including decarbonization and nature protection. However, these institutions have never been perfect or fully coherent in terms of their environmental policies and have recently begun rolling back some progressive environmental policies in response to political backlashes (in the case of the EU) and funding cuts (in the case of transnational donors). Citizens and environmental groups everywhere contribute to upholding and strengthening green reconstruction in Ukraine by pressuring transnational organizations to prioritize environmental challenges in their programs and policies. Putting pressure on governments and companies to end Russian fossil fuel imports further helps the Ukrainian cause, while moving toward carbon neutrality more generally.
Accountability is necessary to enable the passage of legislative frameworks supporting Ukraine’s sustainable recovery, such as the Green Recovery Law, and to ensure their subsequent implementation. This, in turn, requires the swift adoption of secondary legislation. Regulations, decrees, and technical standards issued by governmental agencies must contain detailed rules and mechanisms to translate the law’s objectives into reality, including specific environmental standards for projects, procedures for impact assessments, and enforcement mechanisms. This secondary framework must establish transparent monitoring systems and penalties for non-compliance.
In addition to its already low institutional capacity, the recent liquidation of the Ministry of Environment and the creation of a new ministry that will combine the economy, environment and agriculture may result in environmental deregulation. Ukrainian authorities must translate their promises and pledges to green the economy into effective legislation, and NGOs, international partners and others must hold them accountable.
Signalling unity in the face of Russian aggression and tremendous challenges at the URC is important. It is also important to acknowledge differences in interests and priorities, and limitations imposed by an ongoing war and the limited availability of resources. Nevertheless, the prevailing political and economic pragmatism at the URC and the broader recovery debate can create opportunities.
Even decision-makers who do not ideologically prioritize environmental concerns may be engaged and even persuaded when environmental strategies are presented as addressing multiple pressing needs, especially if promoted by international businesses committed to sustainability, as well as by civil society and academic actors. Civil society organisations, in particular, have a unique and irreplaceable role; they are often the only actors able to credibly represent the voices and needs of people on the ground. Academic institutions, too, can contribute analytical rigor and long-term vision. Together, these actors must proactively communicate how environmental solutions align with broader recovery priorities. Framing policies as ‘win-win’ strategies can be a pragmatic and effective approach, but only if grounded in credibility, inclusiveness, and strategic foresight. This is why planning and scenario development are essential. The Roadmap for the Sustainable Recovery of Ukraine is an excellent example of how coordinated civil society initiatives can generate comprehensive, forward-looking proposals that policymakers can trust and build upon.
At this and previous URCs, there was no official participation category for academics, and the few invited speakers from educational institutions mostly represented business schools. Some scenarios and promises, for example, around green hydrogen, would certainly benefit from a science-based reality check. More generally, scientists can identify risks and propose solutions, bringing attention to systemic environmental relations or lessons to be learned from earlier reforms and transformations in Ukraine and elsewhere. This could benefit the environmental NGOs that have the most persistent voices relating to environmental concerns, though they are sometimes perceived as representing particular and narrow interests and are occasionally criticized for lacking credibility, being seen as activists rather than evidence-based organizations.
Finally, much is changing rapidly and simultaneously across Ukraine’s societal, political, and economic spheres. Alongside the expected reforms, the country is being compelled, by both circumstances and the strategies chosen to address them, to serve as a testing ground for deep and swift structural transformation. However, as past experience in Ukraine and beyond shows, such sweeping changes carry significant risks and can disproportionately impact certain social groups. To mitigate these risks, broad participation across different segments of society and fields of expertise is essential. Environmental issues, alongside social justice, must be treated not as standalone concerns, but as cross-cutting priorities embedded throughout Ukraine’s reform processes and the agenda of the Ukraine Recovery Conferences.
Ievgeniia Kopytsia, University of Genoa and IKEM – Institute for Climate Protection, Energy and Mobility e.V.
Alexander Vorbrugg, University of Bern